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<h2> CHAPTER IX——OF LIARS </h2>
<p>There is not a man living whom it would so little become to speak from
memory as myself, for I have scarcely any at all, and do not think that
the world has another so marvellously treacherous as mine. My other
faculties are all sufficiently ordinary and mean; but in this I think
myself very rare and singular, and deserving to be thought famous. Besides
the natural inconvenience I suffer by it (for, certes, the necessary use
of memory considered, Plato had reason when he called it a great and
powerful goddess), in my country, when they would say a man has no sense,
they say, such an one has no memory; and when I complain of the defect of
mine, they do not believe me, and reprove me, as though I accused myself
for a fool: not discerning the difference betwixt memory and
understanding, which is to make matters still worse for me. But they do me
wrong; for experience, rather, daily shows us, on the contrary, that a
strong memory is commonly coupled with infirm judgment. They do, me,
moreover (who am so perfect in nothing as in friendship), a great wrong in
this, that they make the same words which accuse my infirmity, represent
me for an ungrateful person; they bring my affections into question upon
the account of my memory, and from a natural imperfection, make out a
defect of conscience. "He has forgot," says one, "this request, or that
promise; he no more remembers his friends; he has forgot to say or do, or
conceal such and such a thing, for my sake." And, truly, I am apt enough
to forget many things, but to neglect anything my friend has given me in
charge, I never do it. And it should be enough, methinks, that I feel the
misery and inconvenience of it, without branding me with malice, a vice so
contrary to my humour.</p>
<p>However, I derive these comforts from my infirmity: first, that it is an
evil from which principally I have found reason to correct a worse, that
would easily enough have grown upon me, namely, ambition; the defect being
intolerable in those who take upon them public affairs. That, like
examples in the progress of nature demonstrate to us, she has fortified me
in my other faculties proportionably as she has left me unfurnished in
this; I should otherwise have been apt implicitly to have reposed my mind
and judgment upon the bare report of other men, without ever setting them
to work upon their own force, had the inventions and opinions of others
been ever been present with me by the benefit of memory. That by this
means I am not so talkative, for the magazine of the memory is ever better
furnished with matter than that of the invention. Had mine been faithful
to me, I had ere this deafened all my friends with my babble, the subjects
themselves arousing and stirring up the little faculty I have of handling
and employing them, heating and distending my discourse, which were a
pity: as I have observed in several of my intimate friends, who, as their
memories supply them with an entire and full view of things, begin their
narrative so far back, and crowd it with so many impertinent
circumstances, that though the story be good in itself, they make a shift
to spoil it; and if otherwise, you are either to curse the strength of
their memory or the weakness of their judgment: and it is a hard thing to
close up a discourse, and to cut it short, when you have once started;
there is nothing wherein the force of a horse is so much seen as in a
round and sudden stop. I see even those who are pertinent enough, who
would, but cannot stop short in their career; for whilst they are seeking
out a handsome period to conclude with, they go on at random, straggling
about upon impertinent trivialities, as men staggering upon weak legs.
But, above all, old men who retain the memory of things past, and forget
how often they have told them, are dangerous company; and I have known
stories from the mouth of a man of very great quality, otherwise very
pleasant in themselves, become very wearisome by being repeated a hundred
times over and over again to the same people.</p>
<p>Secondly, that, by this means, I the less remember the injuries I have
received; insomuch that, as the ancient said,—[Cicero, Pro Ligar. c.
12.]—I should have a register of injuries, or a prompter, as Darius,
who, that he might not forget the offence he had received from those of
Athens, so oft as he sat down to dinner, ordered one of his pages three
times to repeat in his ear, "Sir, remember the Athenians";—[Herod.,
v. 105.]—and then, again, the places which I revisit, and the books
I read over again, still smile upon me with a fresh novelty.</p>
<p>It is not without good reason said "that he who has not a good memory
should never take upon him the trade of lying." I know very well that the
grammarians—[Nigidius, Aulus Gellius, xi. ii; Nonius, v. 80.]—
distinguish betwixt an untruth and a lie, and say that to tell an untruth
is to tell a thing that is false, but that we ourselves believe to be
true; and that the definition of the word to lie in Latin, from which our
French is taken, is to tell a thing which we know in our conscience to be
untrue; and it is of this last sort of liars only that I now speak. Now,
these do either wholly contrive and invent the untruths they utter, or so
alter and disguise a true story that it ends in a lie. When they disguise
and often alter the same story, according to their own fancy, 'tis very
hard for them, at one time or another, to escape being trapped, by reason
that the real truth of the thing, having first taken possession of the
memory, and being there lodged impressed by the medium of knowledge and
science, it will be difficult that it should not represent itself to the
imagination, and shoulder out falsehood, which cannot there have so sure
and settled footing as the other; and the circumstances of the first true
knowledge evermore running in their minds, will be apt to make them forget
those that are illegitimate, and only, forged by their own fancy. In what
they, wholly invent, forasmuch as there is no contrary impression to
jostle their invention there seems to be less danger of tripping; and yet
even this by reason it is a vain body and without any hold, is very apt to
escape the memory, if it be not well assured. Of which I had very pleasant
experience, at the expense of such as profess only to form and accommodate
their speech to the affair they have in hand, or to humour of the great
folks to whom they are speaking; for the circumstances to which these men
stick not to enslave their faith and conscience being subject to several
changes, their language must vary accordingly: whence it happens that of
the same thing they tell one man that it is this, and another that it is
that, giving it several colours; which men, if they once come to confer
notes, and find out the cheat, what becomes of this fine art? To which may
be added, that they must of necessity very often ridiculously trap
themselves; for what memory can be sufficient to retain so many different
shapes as they have forged upon one and the same subject? I have known
many in my time very ambitious of the repute of this fine wit; but they do
not see that if they have the reputation of it, the effect can no longer
be.</p>
<p>In plain truth, lying is an accursed vice. We are not men, nor have other
tie upon one another, but by our word. If we did but discover the horror
and gravity of it, we should pursue it with fire and sword, and more
justly than other crimes. I see that parents commonly, and with
indiscretion enough, correct their children for little innocent faults,
and torment them for wanton tricks, that have neither impression nor
consequence; whereas, in my opinion, lying only, and, which is of
something a lower form, obstinacy, are the faults which are to be severely
whipped out of them, both in their infancy and in their progress,
otherwise they grow up and increase with them; and after a tongue has once
got the knack of lying, 'tis not to be imagined how impossible it is to
reclaim it whence it comes to pass that we see some, who are otherwise
very honest men, so subject and enslaved to this vice. I have an honest
lad to my tailor, whom I never knew guilty of one truth, no, not when it
had been to his advantage. If falsehood had, like truth, but one face
only, we should be upon better terms; for we should then take for certain
the contrary to what the liar says: but the reverse of truth has a hundred
thousand forms, and a field indefinite, without bound or limit. The
Pythagoreans make good to be certain and finite, and evil, infinite and
uncertain. There are a thousand ways to miss the white, there is only one
to hit it. For my own part, I have this vice in so great horror, that I am
not sure I could prevail with my conscience to secure myself from the most
manifest and extreme danger by an impudent and solemn lie. An ancient
father says "that a dog we know is better company than a man whose
language we do not understand."</p>
<p>"Ut externus alieno pene non sit hominis vice."<br/>
["As a foreigner cannot be said to supply us the place of a man."<br/>
—Pliny, Nat. Hist. vii. I]<br/></p>
<p>And how much less sociable is false speaking than silence?</p>
<p>King Francis I. vaunted that he had by this means nonplussed Francesco
Taverna, ambassador of Francesco Sforza, Duke of Milan, a man very famous
for his science in talking in those days. This gentleman had been sent to
excuse his master to his Majesty about a thing of very great consequence,
which was this: the King, still to maintain some intelligence with Italy,
out of which he had lately been driven, and particularly with the duchy of
Milan, had thought it convenient to have a gentleman on his behalf to be
with that Duke: an ambassador in effect, but in outward appearance a
private person who pretended to reside there upon his own particular
affairs; for the Duke, much more depending upon the Emperor, especially at
a time when he was in a treaty of marriage with his niece, daughter to the
King of Denmark, who is now dowager of Lorraine, could not manifest any
practice and conference with us without his great interest. For this
commission one Merveille, a Milanese gentleman, and an equerry to the
King, being thought very fit, was accordingly despatched thither with
private credentials, and instructions as ambassador, and with other
letters of recommendation to the Duke about his own private concerns, the
better to mask and colour the business; and was so long in that court,
that the Emperor at last had some inkling of his real employment there;
which was the occasion of what followed after, as we suppose; which was,
that under pretence of some murder, his trial was in two days despatched,
and his head in the night struck off in prison. Messire Francesco being
come, and prepared with a long counterfeit history of the affair (for the
King had applied himself to all the princes of Christendom, as well as to
the Duke himself, to demand satisfaction), had his audience at the morning
council; where, after he had for the support of his cause laid open
several plausible justifications of the fact, that his master had never
looked upon this Merveille for other than a private gentleman and his own
subject, who was there only in order to his own business, neither had he
ever lived under any other aspect; absolutely disowning that he had ever
heard he was one of the King's household or that his Majesty so much as
knew him, so far was he from taking him for an ambassador: the King, in
his turn, pressing him with several objections and demands, and
challenging him on all sides, tripped him up at last by asking, why, then,
the execution was performed by night, and as it were by stealth? At which
the poor confounded ambassador, the more handsomely to disengage himself,
made answer, that the Duke would have been very loth, out of respect to
his Majesty, that such an execution should have been performed by day. Any
one may guess if he was not well rated when he came home, for having so
grossly tripped in the presence of a prince of so delicate a nostril as
King Francis.</p>
<p>Pope Julius II. having sent an ambassador to the King of England to
animate him against King Francis, the ambassador having had his audience,
and the King, before he would give an answer, insisting upon the
difficulties he should find in setting on foot so great a preparation as
would be necessary to attack so potent a King, and urging some reasons to
that effect, the ambassador very unseasonably replied that he had also
himself considered the same difficulties, and had represented them to the
Pope. From which saying of his, so directly opposite to the thing
propounded and the business he came about, which was immediately to incite
him to war, the King of England first derived the argument (which he
afterward found to be true), that this ambassador, in his own mind, was on
the side of the French; of which having advertised his master, his estate
at his return home was confiscated, and he himself very narrowly escaped
the losing of his head.—[Erasmi Op. (1703), iv. col. 684.]</p>
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